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Uninsured Motorist Defined
Henry A. Hentemann*
UTNINSURED MOTORIST INSURANCE is an unusual coverage. The in-
I surance company writing such coverage, as a practical matter,
tends to insure someone whom they really do not want to insure; I the
insured who normally would pursue the tortfeasor pursues his claim
against his own insurance company. The nature of the coverage often
places parties to a friendly contractual agreement in the position of
tortious adversaries.
Being of relatively recent origin,2 it is, in its posture before the law,
still in an awkward stage. It is still trying to become acclimated to its
environment, still attempting to find its true place and to serve its
proper purpose in the insurance world. Although it has not yet fully
matured, it is making rapid progress. Repeated exposure and attack
has given to it some strength as well as some weakness and vulnerability.
The coverage allows an insured to collect from his own insurance
carrier that which he could legally recover from the uninsured motorist,
subject of course, to the limits of the policy. In the standard insuring
agreement, the company promises:
. . . to pay all sums which the insured or his legal representative
shall be legally entitled to recover as damages from the owner or
operator of an uninsured automobile because of bodily injury
sustained by the insured, caused by accident and arising out of
the ownership, maintenance or use of such uninsured automobile.8
(Emphasis added.)
Notwithstanding the fact that the coverage is often referred to in
the trade as uninsured motorist coverage, it is actually uninsured auto-
mobile coverage. Further, the injury claim need not exclusively be pred-
icated upon some motorist's use of such an automobile but can also
arise out of the mere ownership or maintenance of the vehicle. One of
the most important considerations, therefore, under this coverage is
determining the automobile to be an uninsured automobile within the
terms of the contract. What is an uninsured automobile?
* Associate in the law firm of Meyers, Stevens & Rea, Cleveland, Ohio.
I Technically it has been held that Uninsured Motorist coverage does not afford cov-
erage for the uninsured motorist/vehicle but only affords additional protection to the
injured insured, by reason of a contractual agreement. U. S. F. & G. v. Byrum, 146
S.E.2d 246 (Va. 1966); Johnson v. General Mtrs. Corp., 242 F.Supp. 778 (D.C. Va.
1966); Laird v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 243 S.C. 388, 134 S.E.2d 206 (1964); Drewry v.
State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 204 Va. 231, 129 S.E.2d 681 (1963).
2 Protection against Uninsured Motorists first appeared as part of the standard auto-
mobile policy package in 1958. However, for a couple years prior thereto it was
available only by special endorsement. Risjord-Austin, Standard Provisions, 69
(15th Supplement, Dec. 1964).
3 State Farm Mutual Automobile Policy, Insuring Agreement III, effective January,
1966.
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Negatively speaking, the standard policy says through its specific ex-
clusions that an uninsured automobile shall not be the insured auto-
mobile on the policy; nor a vehicle furnished for the regular use of the
named insured or any resident relative of his household; nor one owned
or operated by a self-insurer according to law; nor one owned by the
U. S. A., Canada, a state, a political subdivision of any such govern-
ment or agency of any; nor one designed for use principally off public
roads except when such are actually on public roads; nor one while lo-
cated for use on a premises.4
This article, however, is concerned with the positive definition of an
uninsured automobile, not the exclusions. The standard policy defines,
in a positive sense, the term "uninsured automobile" to mean:
1. A land motor vehicle with respect to the ownership, maintenance
or use of which there is in at least the amounts specified by the
Financial Responsibility law of the state in which the insured
automobile is principally garaged, no bodily injury liability bond
or insurance bond applicable at the time of the accident, with
respect to any person or organization legally responsible for
the use of such vehicle, or with respect to which there is a bodily
injury liability bond or insurance policy applicable at the time
of the accident but the company writing the same denies that
there is any coverage thereunder; or
2. A Hit-and-Run automobile as defined. 5
An attempt will be made to explore the court interpretations of
this definition. However, when reviewing such, three basic considera-
tions must be borne in mind. One is that many states have so-called un-
insured motorist statutes which contain purpose and intent sections
upon which the courts may have relied in allowing a liberal construction
to achieve the purpose intended by the legislature.6 The second is that
simple contract law, without statutory influence, requires that the words
employed be given their plain and commonly understood meaning.7
Thirdly, however, any ambiguity in an insurance contract, it being a
contract of adhesion, shall be construed against the company and will
be given an interpretation most favorable to the insured.8
The obvious admonition, therefore, is that the court rulings cited
herein must be correlated to the particular contract wording considered
by the court and/or a determination made as to whether or not a statu-
tory scheme is involved.
4 Id.
5 Ibid.
6 29 Am. Jur. 450.
7 Id. at 628.
8 Id. at 640.
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Land Motor Vehicle vs. Automobile
It should be noted that in the insuring clause the policy speaks of
an automobile whereas when such uninsured automobile is defined it
states that it must merely be a Land Motor Vehicle. These terms are not
employed in all policies. Many policies still state that an uninsured
automobile must be an "automobile." 9 If such a policy definition is in-
volved, consideration will have to be given to the legal distinctions be-
tween trucks, motorcycles and automobiles, etc.
Under the definition quoted, the policy requires only that the ve-
hicle involved be a Land Motor Vehicle. The broadness of the term
is obvious.
Applicable at the Time of the Accident
Another part of the Uninsured Automobile definition quoted is that
it must be a land motor vehicle:
. . . with respect to the ownership, maintenance or use of which
there is . . . no bodily injury liability bond or insurance policy
applicable at the time of the accident. . . . (emphasis added).
As mentioned earlier, the sole criterion is not only that the operator
have no liability insurance, but that there be no such insurance "ap-
plicable" at the time of the loss. Therefore, when investigating these
losses, inquiry should go beyond merely determining whether the op-
erator has an automobile liability policy, but also should explore other
policies in the family as well as ownership of other vehicles and in-
surance regarding them. Other policies may encompass the allegedly
uninsured automobile.
For example, the tortfeasor may be operating a newly acquired
automobile which was not reported to his insurance carrier, while he
also owned another car which was specifically covered. An Uninsured
Motorist claim may be denied due to the fact that under the existing
policy a newly acquired automobile may also be covered automatically in
spite of lack of notice of such new acquisition by the tortfeasor to his
carrier.10 It is obvious from the policy language that if there is no in-
surance applicable at the time of the loss, the insured may then
proceed under his own policy.
A situation where a truck driver tortfeasor was not operating within
the scope of his employer's business, and had no insurance of his own,
would be a proper uninsured motorist situation allowing an injured in-
sured with uninsured motorist coverage to present a claim, even though
there was insurance on the truck itself. It has been held that since the
carrier for the trucking company properly excluded coverage to a
9 Risjord-Austin, Standard Provisions, 201 (15th Supp., Dec. 1964).
10 American Universal Ins. Co. v. Costello, 95 R.I. 191, 185 A.2d 447 (1962).
Sept., 1967
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driver without permission, the driver was uninsured and there was no
applicable insurance at the time of the loss."
In Whitney v. American Fidelity Company," the Supreme Judicial
Court of Massachusetts was confronted with a situation in which a
guest, in an automobile which did have liability insurance but which
excluded claims of guests, attempted to bring an uninsured motorist
claim under the owner's policy. His owner's carrier argued there was
a liability policy on such auto "applicable at the time of the accident,"
notwithstanding that it didn't cover the guest. It was argued, therefore,
that the automobile did not qualify as an uninsured automobile. The
lower court ruled in favor of the uninsured motorist coverage insurer.
The reviewing court reversed, holding that the dictionary definition of
"applicable" includes the words "fit," "suitable," "pertinent," "appropri-
ate," or "capable of being applied." In view of these definitions, the court
held that at the time of the accident the driver's automobile qualified as
an uninsured automobile within the definition of the uninsured motorist
policy in that there was no insurance with respect to the driver "capa-
ble of being applied" to the bodily injuries of the passenger although
there was a liability policy on the car. The court further reasoned that
there was an ambiguity in the definition of "uninsured automobile"
which must be resolved against the company who wrote the policy.
Subsequent Disclaimer by the Carrier
Further, the coverage being of relatively recent origin, constant
changes are being made. Again, with respect to the clause "Applicable
at the time of the accident," there are many older cases holding that an
insured could not recover under his uninsured motorist coverage if the
tortfeasor was insured at the time of the loss but later the tortfeasor's
carrier denied coverage on the grounds of lack of cooperation on the
part of the tortfeasor. The courts in those cases, 13 giving full weight to
the clause in question, denied coverage under the uninsured motorist
policy, holding the wrongdoing automobile was not uninsured "at the
time of the accident."
One of the cases supporting this reasoning and denying uninsured
motorist coverage because there was insurance at the time of the acci-
dent, although the company subsequently disclaimed thereon, is the
11 Buck v. United States Fidelity and Guarantee Co., 265 N.C. 285, 144 S.E.2d 34
(1965).
12 215 N.E.2d 767 (Mass. 1966).
13 Rosen v. United States Fidelity and Guarantee Co., 23 A.D.2d 335, 260 N.Y.S.2d
677 (1965); McDaniel v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co., 205 Va. 815, 139
S.E.2d 806 (1965); Berman v. Travelers Indemnity Co., 11 Misc.2d 291, 171 N.Y.S.2d
869 (S. Ct. 1958); Application of American National Fire Ins. Co., 15 Misc.2d 692, 182
N.Y.S.2d 899 (S. Ct. 1958).
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Application of Vanguard Ins. Co. 14 The New York court was confronted
with the simple policy definition of "applicable at the time of the acci-
dent," without further elaboration. The Appellate Division court of
that state held that the language of the policy was "clear and un-
ambiguous and no strained or unnatural construction can be given to
it to provide otherwise" than to deny that the automobile was an un-
insured automobile within the terms of the 'policy.
However, the case was ultimately further appealed to the highest
court in New York,15 which decided the matter on November 22, 1966.
The New York Court of Appeals disagreed with the Appellate Divi-
sion's decision that the language was clear and unambiguous and
stated that construction was necessary, that it must be construed within
the context of the clause wherein it is found and in light of the pur-
pose sought to be accomplished by the clause. Interestingly, the court
also stated that although New York's statutory definition of an unin-
sured motorist was not controlling, this being a contract matter, it still
was not to be completely ignored since the purpose of the contract cov-
erage was the same as that of the statutes.
The tortfeasor in that case was one named Smith, and his liability
insurer was Glens Falls Ins. Company. Vanguard was the uninsured
motorist carrier of the injured party. The highest court of New York
stated:
The disclaimer by Glens Falls related back to the time of the acci-
dent and left Smith uninsured against liability arising out of the
accident. Smith was just as financially irresponsible as a result of
the disclaimer as he would have been if he never took out a policy.
The view, therefore, that a disclaimed uncollectible policy is a policy
applicable at the time of the accident is an unnecessarily restrictive
one which defeats the very purpose of the uninsured motorist clause
and ignores the spirit, if not the letter, of Section 167 (Subd. 2-a).
(emphasis added).10
The New York Court of Appeals further reasoned that the policy's
negative definition of an uninsured automobile did not exclude an auto
upon which there has been a disclaimer of coverage. Thus, by in-
ference the court stated an auto upon which there is a disclaimer of cov-
erage is an uninsured auto. If the insurance company intended to ex-
clude cases involving subsequent disclaimers of coverage, they should
have explicitly written them into the exclusionary clauses which neg-
atively define an uninsured automobile.
The New York ruling in the Vanguard case, 17 and its "relating
back" theory, is noteworthy in that it held the simple clause "applicable
14 23 A.D.2d 625, 257 N.Y.S.2d 740 (1965).
15 18 N.Y.2d 376, 275 N.Y.S.2d 515 (1966).
16 Id. at 381.
17 Appl. of Vanguard Ins. Co., supra n. 15.
Sept., 1967
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at the time of the accident" to be ambiguous and, therefore, allowed the
purpose and intent of the contract, guided by that state's statutory
scheme, to be applied with a liberal construction as a result. It seems
that the New York court abrogated strict contract interpretation princi-
ples to achieve a desired result.
Nevertheless, even before that decision, many policies expanded
on their uninsured automobile definition clause of no insurance "ap-
plicable at the time of the accident" to also include:
. . . or with respect to which there is a bodily injury liability bond
or insurance policy applicable at the time of the accident but the
company writing the same denies that there is any coverage there-
under. (emphasis added).
On first blush the language employed seems to be extremely broad.
It would appear that the only thing needed in situations where valid
insurance exists on the tortfeasor's automobile is for the carrier on the
adverse vehicle to merely deny coverage. There is nothing in the
language which goes to the substance of the disclaimer of coverage by
the other company. It would also appear that questions as to whether
the adverse vehicle's carrier should actually cover the loss or not cannot
now first be resolved in a court of law since the very definition of an
uninsured automobile merely requires a denial of coverage by such
carrier.
In fact, there are several lower court rulings in New York which
tend to support this conclusion. In the cases of MVAIC v. Morera,1
8
in the Matter of MVAIC (Holley),19 and Kaiser v. MVAIC, 20 the New
York courts were considering a statute that included under uninsured
motorist coverage a right to recover for injuries "from the owner or
operator of an insured automobile, the insurer of which has disclaimed
liability or denied coverage." The similarity between the statute and
the expanded definition of an uninsured automobile in many of the
newer policies is obvious. In all three cases cited above, the insurer of
the tortfeasor denied coverage, and each involved a motion to stay
arbitration until the coverage question was resolved. In each case the
motion was denied. In the Morera case, 21 the court said that there is
no "requirement" that the disclaimer be valid, and that, on the motion
to stay arbitration, the "court's duty was limited to determining
whether insurer disclaimed liability and did not extend to determining
(the) validity of disclaimer." In the Holley matter,2 2 the court held
that the injured party was "required to show that disclaimer had been
18 31 Misc.2d 51, 219 N.Y.S.2d 553 (S.Ct. 1961).
19 33 Misc.2d 567, 227 N.Y.S.2d 864 (S. Ct. 1962).
20 35 Misc.2d 636, 231 N.Y.S.2d 178 (S. Ct. 1962).
21 MVAIC v. Morera, supra n. 18.
22 MVAIC (Holley), supra n. 19.
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made but was not required to show that it was 'prima facie' valid, as
prerequisite to enforcement of claim . . . through arbitration." The
Kaiser case2 3 concurs and further states that if the respondent believes
that the other carrier was not justified in denying coverage, "then it may
proceed against that company pursuant to the subrogation provision of
its contract . . . " after the uninsured motorist claim is resolved in ar-
bitration.
Again, however, the highest court in New York recently felt the
"disclaimer" requirement in the definition deserved its pronouncement.
In the case entitled the Matter of MVAIC (Malone), 24 the highest court
of that state said that where the insured, having a policy with the
MVAIC endorsement (uninsured motorist coverage), collided with a ve-
hicle of an alleged tortfeasor, a
• . .unilateral declaration of non-coverage by insurer of alleged tort-
feasor did not ipso facto and without judicial investigation satisfy
the requirement . . . that alleged tortfeasor must have been un-
insured, and MVAIC had opportunity . .. to litigate before the
court, . . . the question whether alleged tortfeasor's policy was
validly cancelled.
In 1966, this question was again before the courts of New York,2 5
and in both instances the Malone case 20 was affirmed and followed. It
appears, therefore, that in New York the validity of the disclaimer by
the other carrier can still be examined and judicially determined before
the insurance company is forced to arbitrate or pay under its uninsured
motorist coverage.
What other courts will do with the expanded contract definition of
-n uninsured automobile remains to be seen. As previously stated, it
would seem that mere proof of denial of coverage by the adverse carrier
could allow coverage to an insured under his uninsured motorist provi-
sions. If it should be construed as ambiguous, the ambiguity will be
resolved in favor of the insured. Probably it will rest with the drafters
of the policy to reword or define such clause in order to fully protect
themselves from costly litigation upon capricious denials of coverage by
the tortfeasor's insurance carrier.
Somewhat on the subject is the situation of a denial of coverage
by the adverse carrier, denied on the grounds that they didn't cover
the risk, claiming the acts of their insured was an intentional act. Can
there now be a claim against the uninsured motorist carrier by the
injured party? The other driver is legally responsible; the insured has
23 Kaiser v. MVAIC, supra n. 20.
24 16 N.Y.2d 1027, 265 N.Y.S.2d 906 (1965).
25 MVAIC v. National Grange Mutual Ins. Co., 26 A.D.2d 6, 270 N.Y.S.2d 245 (1966);
Carlos v. MVAIC, 17 N.Y.2d 614, 268 N.Y.S.2d 930 (1966).
26 MVAIC (Malone), supra n. 24.
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a right to recover damages, and the other driver's carrier has denied
coverage.
In McCarthy v. MVAIC, 27 the New York reviewing court made
some sharp distinctions. In that case, the plaintiff was injured when
her brother-in-law intentionally collided with her vehicle. Her brother-
in-law's carrier denied coverage on the grounds that her injuries were
not "caused by accident." She subsequently made a claim under unin-
sured motorist coverage. The lower court ruled in her favor, and the
appellate court reversed. In dealing with the question of the brother-
in-law's auto being an uninsured automobile, the court relied on the
MVAIC law of New York which defined the term "disclaimer or de-
nial of liability" as a repudiation by the adverse carrier of liability "be-
cause of some act or omission of the person or persons liable or alleged
to be liable." The court said "this refers to an act or omission by the
insured automobile owner in his relationship to his company, constituting
a breach of the conditions of the policy." The court went on to state:
A sharp distinction must be made between (a) a finding that the
insurance company is not liable under a valid policy because the
injuries were not caused by accident and hence were not within the
risks covered by the policy and (b) a finding that the company is
not liable because the policy was not in force at the time in ques-
tion or because there had been a breach of a condition of the policy
by the insured rendering it unenforceable. (emphasis added).
The court held that in the latter situation, (b), the vehicle was an un-
insured vehicle; in the former, (a), if the standard policy covered "all
the risks required to be covered," it was not an uninsured automobile.
Note the distinction between this reasoning and that by the Massachu-
setts Court in the Whitney case 28 in which the "risk" of a claim by a
guest was excluded from the tortfeasor's policy and yet an uninsured
motorist claim was allowed. However, it must be emphasized that the
New York court was determining a statutory claim which included a
clause regarding a company's denial of coverage and further had a
statutory definition of "disclaimer or denial of liability." The case is
also distinguishable on the grounds that the loss was not truly "an acci-
dent."
Subsequent Insolvency of Tortfeasor's Carrier
Another situation is involved when an adverse vehicle is insured at
the time of the accident but his insurance carrier subsequently becomes
insolvent. And again we have situations involving a contract with the
expanded definition including disclaimers by the tortfeasor's carrier and
those that involve policies only requiring no insurance "applicable at
the time of the accident."
27 16 A.D.2d 35, 224 N.Y.S.2d 909 (1962).
28 Whitney v. Am. Fidelity Co., supra n. 12.
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In the case of State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co. v. Brower,29 Brower
was injured in an accident and sued the tortfeasor who was insured.
The tortfeasor's carrier did not defend, made no appearance, and of-
fered no defense to the suit. Later it was determined that the tortfeasor's
carrier was hopelessly insolvent and a receiver was appointed who also
did not provide a defense. The Virginia statute includes in its defini-
tion of an uninsured automobile one on which "there is such insurance
but the company writing the same denies coverage thereunder." The
Virginia court refused to decide whether a policy in a defunct, hope-
lessly insolvent company is still a policy as will prevent an auto from
being an uninsured automobile. Instead, the court held that there had
been an effective denial of coverage by the other carrier by refusing
to enter the case against its insured and offering a defense while in their
policy they promised to "defend any suit against the insured alleging
such injury.
The North Carolina Supreme Court, in the case of The North River
Ins. Co. v. Gibson,30 followed the State Farm3 l ruling on the basis of the
broad statutory definition which included an uninsured motorist as one
insured but whose carrier denies coverage. The court held that in this
case, even though the subsequently insolvent company actually entered
the case and afforded a defense, although their attorneys subsequently
withdrew from the case, coverage was "effectively denied" when they
withdrew from the defense of their insured. Again, the court relied
upon an effective denial by a carrier and did not discuss the question
of insurance "applicable at the time of the loss."
Recently, a California appellate court also followed the "effective
denial" theory in Katz v. American Motorist Ins. Co.,32 in a case of sub-
sequent insolvency on the part of the adverse carrier. California has an
uninsured motorist statute which defines an uninsured automobile in
the same language as the expanded policy definition.
However, in Swaringin v. Allstate Ins. Co.,33 a Missouri court was
considering a claim against Allstate's uninsured motorist coverage by
the insured who was injured in an accident and where the tortfeasor's
carrier subsequently became insolvent. Allstate's policy did not include
the broad language but merely defined an uninsured automobile as one
having no insurance "applicable at the time of the accident." The clause
was held unambiguous and, therefore, even though the tortfeasor's car-
29 204 Va. 887, 134 S.E.2d 277 (1964).
30 244 S.C. 393, 137 S.E.2d 264 (1967).
31 State Farm Mut. v. Brower, supra n. 29.
32 53 Cal. Rptr. 669 (Cal.App. 1966).
33 399 S.W.2d 131 (Mo.App. 1966).
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rier subsequently became insolvent, a claim could not be maintained
under Allstate's policy of uninsured motorist coverage since the other
auto was not uninsured "at the time of the loss." This reasoning has been
followed in many cases.3 4
It appears from the cases on the subject that if the definition of
uninsured automobile merely refers to insurance "applicable at the time
of the accident," subsequent insolvency would not render the automobile
an uninsured automobile. However, the Vanguard15 decision out of
New York is ever present in the background as authority upon which
other courts might rely to include within the uninsured automobile defi-
nition cases involving subsequent insolvency on the part of the tort-
feasor's insurance carrier. It seems certain New York will do so, apply-
ing their "relating back" theory. This is with respect to cases involving
contracts which do not have the expanded definition.
In cases involving the expanded definition which includes "denial
of coverage," there is other authority to construe the tortfeasor's auto-
mobile uninsured by his carrier's subsequent insolvency if they do not
afford him a defense, or withdraw from such defense, such act of
omission by his carrier is construed as an effective denial of the coverage
they promised by contract. 6
Insufficient Coverage
Another clause in the definition of uninsured automobile is that it
be an auto with respect to which there is no insurance,
• . . in at least the amounts specified by the financial responsibility
law of the state in which the insured automobile is principally
garaged ...
First of all, it is noteworthy that the definition refers only to
where the insured automobile is principally garaged; where the acci-
dent occurs is not controlling.
Therefore, in view of the fact that thirteen states require minimum
limits of 5/10 coverage to comply with the financial responsibility laws
34 Federal Ins. Co. v. Speight, 220 F.Supp. 90 (E.D. S.C. 1963); Hardin v. American
Mutual Fire Ins. Co., 261 N.C. 67, 134 S.E.2d 142 (1964); Stone v. Liberty Mutual Ins.
Co., 397 S.W.2d 411 (Tenn.App. 1965); Rice v. Aetna Cas. and Sur. Co., 267 N.C. 387,
148 S.E.2d 223 (1966).
35 Appl. of Vanguard Ins. Co., supra n. 15.
36 Very recently a Pennsylvania reviewing court refused this theory holding that
the definition including disclaimer by the tortfeasor's carrier did not apply to a
subsequent insolvency situation. The court held that such "denial of coverage"
definition clause means a rejection of the policyholder as an insured and a refusal
to accord him the protection he contracted for; and does not mean the inability to
collect the full amount of the damages from the insurer. Pattani v. Keystone Ins.
Co., 209 Pa. Super. 79, 223 A.2d 899 (1966). The case was certified to the state's high-
est court in February, 1967. Their decision is not yet reported.
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of their state37 and that thirty-three states require 10/2038 and that three
states require 15/30,39 it is very probable for a resident insured of one
state to have an accident with a non-resident tortfeasor of another state
who was only required to have liability insurance with limits less than
that required in the state where the injured insured's automobile is
principally garaged. By definition, therefore, the injured insured would
have a claim under his uninsured motorist coverage. However, the ques-
tion would be the amount of insurance coverage available to the insured
under his uninsured motorist coverage.
Only one case can be found on the subject situation, 40 which is that
of White v. Nationwide Mutual Ins. Co. and Allstate Ins. Co.41 In Vir-
ginia, the Financial Responsibility Act requires a minimum limit of
$15,000 per person. The insured, a Virginia resident, under an uninsured
motorist policy with Nationwide, was injured in an accident, and the tort-
feasor, a Tennessee resident, was insured by Allstate with $10,000 limits
per person. When inadequate limits were discovered, Nationwide was
notified. Suit was brought against the tortfeasor and a $22,000 judgment
was recovered. The insured then sued Allstate and Nationwide, and
Allstate paid their policy limits into court. The insured sued Nation-
wide for $15,000, the uninsured motorist coverage limit. In considering
the amount recoverable, the Federal District Court stated that since the
tortfeasor did not have limits sufficient to meet Virginia's Financial Re-
sponsibility Law, it was an uninsured automobile according to defini-
tion.
Nationwide argued, since Allstate covered and paid $10,000, their
maximum payment should be $5,000, to bring such recovery up to the
difference between what Allstate paid and the limit of Nationwide's
policy and the minimum requirements of the Financial Responsibility
Law of the state. The insured argued for $12,000 to meet the balance
outstanding on the judgment. The Federal Court held that "the full
37 Colorado, Idaho, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Mississippi, Mis-
souri, Montana, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Oregon and Rhode Island. Oregon re-
quires 5/20 coverage.
38 Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Illi-
nois, Indiana, Iowa, Maine, Michigan, Minnesota, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire,
New Jersey, North Dakota, New Mexico, New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania, South
Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Washington, West Vir-
ginia, Wisconsin and Wyoming. In this group, though not a state, is the District of
Columbia.
39 Alaska, Maryland and Virginia.
40 Although the Rhode Island court was not deciding the amount recoverable under
the uninsured motorist coverage when the tortfeasor has insufficient coverage, they
nevertheless held that even though the policy contract did not have the specific
wording in the definition to include as an uninsured automobile one which had
limits less than the state's financial responsibility law requires, a tortfeasor who
actually had such insufficient coverage was an uninsured motorist allowing an in-jured insured to seek additional recovery under his uninsured motorist coverage.
Allstate Ins. Co. v. Fusco, 223 A.2d 447 (R.I. 1966).
41 245 F.Supp. 1 (W.D. Va. 1965).
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limits of Nationwide's policy are available to satisfy the unpaid part of
the judgment." As its authority, the Federal Court cited Bryant v. State
Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co.,42 in which the Virginia court said:
The limit of recovery of the plaintiff under any or all insurance
policies carrying the uninsured motorist provision . . . would be
the amount of the insured's judgment against the uninsured mo-
torist.
As mentioned, this is the only case found on the specific subject
question, and it comes out of Virginia, which has an uninsured motorist
statute. The White case 43 relied upon the Bryant case44 which in turn
definitely relied upon Virginia's statutory scheme to allow an injured
passenger to collect under both his driver's uninsured motorist coverage
as well as his own personal uninsured motorist coverage with a different
carrier.
It still remains to be seen, in the appropriate case, whether states
without statutory schemes as to uninsured motorist cases will still allow
full recovery of the limits of the uninsured motorist policy even after
the full amount of the tortfeasor's policy has been exhausted; or whether
they will limit such to only allow total recovery to be equivalent to the
minimum requirements of the Financial Responsibility Law.
Hit and Run Coverage
The final definition of an uninsured automobile is "a hit and run
automobile, as defined." The subject of hit and run coverage, with its
lengthy definition, could be a subject for an entire article. However, for
the purposes of this article, the following substantive requirements of
the definition of a hit and run automobile will only be considered. It is
defined to be:
a land motor vehicle which causes bodily injury to an insured
arising out of physical contact of such vehicle with the insured or
with an automobile which the insured is occupying at the time of
the accident, provided: (1) There cannot be ascertained the identity
of either the operator or owner of such "hit and run automobile."
Under this coverage physical contact is a requirement upheld by
many court rulings which requirement allows protection to the carrier
against fraud and, therefore, is not contrary to public policy. However,
as will be noted below, some inroads have been made on the strict in-
terpretation of such definition requirement.
Let us first consider that part of the definition which requires that a
land motor vehicle cause "bodily injury to an insured arising out of
physical contact.. . ." In Bashore v. Allstate Ins. Co.,43 the plaintiff was
42 205 Va. 897, 140 S.E.2d 817 (1965).
43 White v. Nationwide & Allstate, supra n. 41.
44 Bryant v. State Farm Mut., supra n. 42.
45 374 S.W.2d 626 (Mo.App. 1963).
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in an auto which was struck a glancing blow by a hit and run motorist,
forced off the road and into a tree. Allstate's counsel advanced the
argument that the insured could only recover for those injuries caused
by the actual impact with the hit and run auto and not those caused
by the impact with the tree. The court dismissed that argument, hold-
ing that the insured could recover for all injuries of which the hit and
run vehicle was the proximate cause since physical contact was estab-
lished.
The other part of the hit and run definition which has caused some
concern is that the injuries must arise out of "physical contact of such
vehicle with the insured or with an automobile which the insured is oc-
cupying at the time of the accident." (Emphasis added.)
Earlier cases on the subject gave strict interpretation to that clause
denying uninsured motorist coverage when a hit and run vehicle hit
another vehicle, pushing that other vehicle into the insured's vehicle on
the ground that there was no actual direct contact between the hit and
run vehicle and that vehicle in which the insured was riding, as re-
quired by definition.
In Bellavia v. MVAIC, 46 Bellavia was walking on a sidewalk past a*
Chevrolet when a Ford struck the Chevrolet, pushing it onto the side-
walk, striking Bellavia. The Ford kept going, and the name of the driver
was not obtained. It was ascertained by the police that the Ford was
stolen and was being operated without the knowledge or consent of the
owner. The lower court in New York denied the application of Bellavia,
holding that the bodily injury "did not arise out of physical contact be-
tween the injured insured and the 'hit and run' vehicle itself." Also, in In
re Portman's Petition,4 7 Portman, a blind person, had been knocked down
by an automobile when crossing an intersection. While lying on the
ground, she was again injured when another vehicle, allegedly a hit and
run automobile, collided with the first vehicle and caused the latter to
strike the injured person a second time. Again the New York lower court
denied the claim on the ground that there was no actual physical contact
with the hit and run vehicle itself which caused the bodily injury.
However, in Inter-Insurance Exchange of the Auto. Club of So.
California v. Lopez, 48 Lopez, who had a policy with the Exchange in-
cluding hit and run coverage with the physical contact requirement, was
struck by an automobile that came across the center divider driven by
one Mr. Clements. Mr. Clements had been struck previously by a third
vehicle which continued on its way, and its identity was unknown. The
insurance company denied liability on the grounds that actual physical
contact was not had between the insured vehicle and the alleged hit and
46 28 Misc.2d 420, 211 N.Y.S.2d 356 (Sup. Ct. 1961).
47 33 Misc.2d 385, 225 N.Y.S.2d 560 (Sup. Ct. 1962).
48 238 Cal.App.2d 441, 47 Cal. Rptr. 834 (1965).
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run vehicle. Judgment was in favor of the insurance company. Lopez
appealed.
The District Court of Appeals in California reversed the lower
court. California has an Uninsured Motorist Statute which, since 1961,
required physical contact under the Hit and Run Provisions. The court
held that the requirement of physical contact was "designed to elimi-
nate fictitious and fraudulent claims, not to lessen coverage." The fact
that the hit and run auto hit another auto first, pushing it into the in-
sured, the court compared to the common law concept of trespass on the
case, an indirect wrong that was actionable, and held that the facts of
this case met the physical contact requirements of the policy. What is
interesting to note, bearing in mind that California has an Uninsured
Motorist statutory scheme, is the court's further statement that:
The physical contact requirement, designed to prevent false claims,
should not be extended to defeat recovery in cases where fraud
clearly does not exist.
This is an obvious departure from prior case rulings on the con-
tact requirement, but one must remember the court was discussing the
purpose and intent of the statute, not a contractual provision.
Shortly after the California case was decided, New York's highest
court was confronted with the indirect contact situation, and they were
further confronted with the prior lower court decisions of their state as
expressed above. 49 In the case of MVAIC v. Eisenberg,50 the court
stated that whether "physical contact" requires actual touching between
the hit and run vehicle and the appellant's vehicle is to be determined
"not as an abstract proposition, but as an integrated phrase in a statutory
scheme." New York also has an Uninsured Motorist Statute. The court
went on to say that in "most factual situations, the absence of the re-
quired contact will preclude resort to Arbitration." But, the court fur-
ther stated that "it is equally apparent that the actual contact situation
is judicially undistinguishable from the situation in the present case.
The vehicle which made actual contact with the appellant's auto in this
case was a mere intermediary, and in the circumstances we think it
cannot logically serve to insulate the respondent from arbitration."
The New York court, as the California court did, went on to explain
the purpose of the Uninsured Motorist statute, stating that it is "readily
discerned when we examine the need which gave rise to its enactment."
The court continued:
The assertion of a hit-and-run accident is a proposition easy to al-
lege and difficult to disprove. Absent protective legislation, it opens
the door to abuses, including fraud and collusion. . . . The problem
however virtually disappears with the requirement of physical con-
49 Bellavia v. MVAIC, supra n. 46; In re Portman, supra n. 47.
50 18 N.Y.2d 1, 271 N.Y.S.2d 641 (1966).
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tact. . . . physical contact almost invariably produces physical evi-
dence of impact, [and] the possibility of a "phantom" hit-and-run
driver becomes minimal. Thus the rationale for requiring proof of
physical contact becomes apparent, while the requirement of "actual"
impact between the hit-and-run vehicle and the insured vehicle
recedes.
It appears that the New York case is not as strong as the California
case as to the physical contact requirement. Carrying the California
case to an extreme conclusion, it would appear that they might eventually
allow a claim under hit and run coverage, pursuant to their statute, in
a case where the insured is forced off the road without physical con-
tact provided the case could be substantiated by objective witnesses and
the element of fraud removed. New York still adheres to the contact re-
quirement, but now has allowed "indirect" contact as opposed to prior
rulings strictly holding to "direct impact" between the alleged hit and
run auto and the insured or insured vehicle.
It is interesting to note in the Eisenberg case5 l that two judges dis-
sented, claiming that "words that have a plain meaning and a commonly
understood legal effect ought not to be rationalized to a different mean-
ing because it seems desirable to escape the effect of reading them as
they are." They go along with the strict interpretation followed by the
Bellavia52 and Portman53 cases. However, there are indications of a
trend developing to give a more liberal construction to the contact re-
quirement contained in the "hit and run" provisions.
Unascertainable Identity
Let us consider next the requirement of the hit and run definition
which states ". . . that there cannot be ascertained the identity of either
the operator or owner of such 'hit and run' automobile." Questions in
this regard can arise as to when must the identity be not ascertainable.
What if the identity could have been ascertained, yet it wasn't, or what
if it was ascertained at the time of the accident, but subsequently such
information was lost or forgotten by the insured.
In the case of Mangus v. Doe,"4 the insured was rear-ended by
another auto after which they got out, examined their vehicles and de-
termined that no physical damage had been done to either car. Neither
obtained the name, vehicle license numbers nor any information re-
lating to their identities. Subsequently, the insured discovered that he
had suffered a ruptured disc. Remembering that in Virginia an unin-
sured motorist statute includes "unknown" owner or operators, never-
51 Ibid.
52 Bellavia v. MVAIC, supra n. 46.
53 In re Portman, supra n. 47.
54 203 Va. 518, 125 S.E.2d 166 (1962).
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theless, the Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals does state the follow-
ing with some applicable significance. The court said that the statute
• . . does not say that if an insured fails to exercise due care or
diligence to ascertain the identity of an unknown motorist causing
him bodily injury . . . he cannot maintain an action. . . . For us to
say that an insured had the duty to exercise due diligence to ascer-
tain the identity of an unknown motorist would be reading into the
statute language which does not appear there.
In the case of Shaw v. MVAIC, 55 a lower court of New York was
considering a claim under the "Hit and Run" section of the New York In-
surance Statutes, which allowed claims when the "identity of the motor
vehicle and of the operator and owner thereof cannot be ascertained,"
provided other statutory requirements were met. In this case, Shaw was
a pedestrian when he was hit, and the driver that hit him took Shaw
home after the accident and supplied Shaw with a piece of paper on
which were written some names and addresses, which were understood to
be that of the driver and passenger. Shaw claimed he was dazed and
semi-conscious. Later the paper was lost and the information had failed
to lead to the identification of the motor vehicle, owner, or operator.
Bearing in mind that this was a statutory procedure under New
York's Insurance law, the court stated that the law
• . . mentioned "hit and run" in their titles, nevertheless, the pro-
visions of these sections indicate a more accurate name of "hit and
hide." In other words, after the hit, there must be a successful
hiding of the involved motor vehicle and the owner and operator
thereof, whose identity cannot be ascertained after the exercise of
all reasonable efforts.
In the Shaw case, 50 the application was temporarily denied until a
statutorily required Commissioner's "certified abstract of the operating
record" of the persons involved was completed. If that still were to
bear out the unascertainability of operator, etc., the application was to
be granted.
In Petition of Casanova,5 7 the court allowed a claim under the hit
and run provisions, wherein the petitioner was hit by an automobile,
and the driver of the automobile went to a police officer and described
the incident and then took the petitioner to the hospital for treatment
and thereafter disappeared. The patrolman verified the fact of the re-
port, but no corroboration of the alleged report was on record at the
police department. The lower court of New York held that the statutory
requirement of a report to police authorities within twenty-four hours
was met, and the requirement requires no more than a "report," and
failure of the police to make a record does not invalidate the claim.
55 24 Misc.2d 489, 199 N.Y.S.2d 689 (S. Ct. 1960).
56 Ibid.
57 36 Misc.2d 489, 232 N.Y.S.2d 713 (S. Ct. 1962).
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The other question before the court in that matter was whether
the driver was a "hit and run" auto when he went with the petitioner
to the police to report the incident, since he did not leave the scene of
the occurrence. The court stated that the "hit and run" words used in
the Insurance statute "did not embrace the wording nor the intent of
the penal provisions of the vehicle and Traffic Law." Further, the court
went into the legislative purpose section of the Insurance law, and the
definition of a "Hit and Run" automobile which contains no further
elaboration of the words than "the identity of the motor vehicle and of
the operator and owner thereof cannot be ascertained."
Recently, in October, 1966, an appellate division court of New York
ruled on the question in Riemenschneider v. MVAIC. 5 In that case, the
facts were almost identical to those in the Mangus case. 59 Coun-
sel for MVAIC argued that the definition requirement meant that
the identity could not be ascertained "at the time of the accident," not
later when injuries developed; that if identity is ascertainable at the time
of the accident it was not a "hit and run" automobile and thus not un-
insured under the "hit and run" policy provision. The court agreed with
the factual contention but not the conclusion, stating there is nothing
in the definition which specifies the time as to which, or the circum-
stances in which identity is to be deemed ascertainable. The court went
on to say:
Whatever the connotations of precipitate flight because of guilt and
fear the term "hit and run" may bear in- colloquial usage, they
have notably been permitted no expression in the insurance policy
definition or in cognate MVAIC legislation. . . . The emphasis is
on inability to identify. The cause of the inability may most fre-
quently be reprehensible flight, but that is not made a sine qua
non. To make it one would in our opinion constrict gratuitously the
remedial purpose underlying the MVAIC endorsement....
It appears that if all other policy definition requirements as to noti-
fication of police, report to company and contact, etc., are met, a tort-
feasor who cannot be found would qualify as an uninsured motorist
under the hit and run provisions of the policy. Obviously, this could
be a windfall to the unscrupulous opportunists. What other courts will
do with the clause again remains to be seen. Possibly a policy definition
of the clause to mean identity which cannot be ascertained at the time
of the accident would be the best and most reliable solution.
Conclusion
In attempting to summarize the case decisions on the subject, the
reader must remember the basic considerations initially stated in this
58 26 A.D.2d 309, 274 N.Y.S.2d 71 (1966).
59 MVAIC v. Eisenberg, supra n. 50.
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article distinguishing between decisions possibly influenced by a state's
statutory scheme and the same situation in states without statutory in-
fluence.
In the cases of subsequent insolvency or subsequent disclaimer by
the adverse vehicle's carrier, it seems that the answer to the question of
whether or not the expanded definition is employed controls. Many
policies do not yet include in their definition of an uninsured automobile
one on which there was insurance but the insurer thereof denies cov-
erage. In those cases, many courts have merely looked at the phrase
"at the time of the accident," and have held that subsequent disclaimer
or insolvency does not bring the adverse vehicle within the policy defini-
tion of an uninsured automobile. Bear in mind, however, New York's
very recent departure in the Vanguard case,60 holding such disclaimer
to "relate back" to the loss.
However, if the policy contains the expanded definition which in-
cludes an adverse vehicle whose carrier subsequently denies coverage
thereunder as an uninsured automobile, another problem arises: whether
or not mere denial is sufficient or must it be a valid denial. New York
seems to have resolved this problem, holding that the validity of such
disclaimer can still be challenged in the courts by the uninsured mo-
torist coverage insurer. How other courts will decide remains to be
seen. It would seem that a strict reading of the words used would merely
require proof that the other carrier disclaimed, nothing more. The policy
definition as written does not require such disclaimer to be legally valid.
As the earlier New York cases held, the uninsured motorist carrier can
seek recourse through subrogation.
As to the problem of subsequent insolvency under the expanded defi-
nition, a few courts have decided that a failure on the part of the in-
solvent company to fully defend the insured as promised is tantamount
to an "effective denial" of the coverage promised their insured and,
therefore, brings him within the definition of an uninsured motorist.
Whether other courts will adopt this reasoning remains to be seen. Under
the simple definition merely stating there must be no insurance ap-
plicable at the time of the loss, some courts still hold a subsequent in-
solvency case not within the uninsured motorist coverage. However, the
Vanguard case,6 1 with its theory of relating back, may influence future
decisions.
The policy definition including as an uninsured automobile one
which has limits of coverage less than required by the state's Financial
Responsibility Act where the claimant's vehicle is principally garaged
has some interesting sidelights. The place of the accident does not seem
60 Appl. of Vanguard Ins. Co., supra n. 15.
61 Ibid.
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to be determinative as to whether a disparity in limits exists. It is the
place where the insured automobile is principally garaged that controls.
As to the amount of coverage available to the insured under the un-
insured motorist coverage, there is only one decision on the subject.
It has held that the entire uninsured motorist policy limit is still avail-
able after the adverse vehicle's policy has been exhausted; even if that
means a greater total recovery to the insured than the uninsured motorist
coverage alone would have provided or more than the Financial Respon-
sibility Act of that state requires. This decision was influenced by the
Virginia statutory provisions.
The cases on the "hit and run" clauses have all come out of states
with statutory schemes conducive to liberal construction. However, in
view of the fact that other states have not ruled on the subject, these
decisions will be examined by them and possibly adopted. New York
and California seem to have done away with the requirement of direct
impact between such hit and run vehicle and the insured or the vehicle
in which he is riding. Whether other states will still require direct touch-
ing between those vehicles, based on strict contractual interpretation,
remains to be seen, but it is doubtful. Reading between the lines in the
California case, it is conceivable that California might go so far as to
allow recovery even if there is no contact if the possible element of
fraud is sufficiently dispelled. Further, under these provisions the clause
dealing with the requirement that the tortfeasor's identity be unascer-
tainable, the New York courts have held that the words used lack
policy or statutory explanation, and, therefore, the time when such
motorist's identity cannot be ascertained is immaterial. The contract
might be held in other states to be sufficiently ambiguous to allow "hit
and hide" coverage, other requirements being met.
In the last analysis, it is obvious there are no hard-fast universal
conclusions that can be drawn as to each phase of the definition except
as the specific decision rendered affects the coverage in the specific state
in which it was rendered. However, when other courts are called upon
to decide these same issues, they will certainly look to other states for
help; and in that regard only should cognizance be had of what other
courts are doing. The similarity between the specific state's statutory
scheme and that of the state looked to for guidance should dictate the
weight to be given to liberal constructions. Strict adherence to plain
and commonly understood meanings is still a basic law of contracts,
barring ambiguity, and resulting unfortunate hardship, notwithstanding.
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